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ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE*
PAMELA H. BUCY**
On November 1, 1991, after five years of dialogue, discussion, and
study, the federal Sentencing Guidelines for organizations (the "Sentenc-
ing Guidelines" or the "Guidelines") went into effect.1 These Guidelines
allow organizations convicted of crimes to reduce substantially their pun-
ishment by showing corporate good citizenry. Such "good citizenry" in-
cludes effective internal compliance programs and cooperation with the
government regarding the violation.2 While this effort to promote corpo-
rate responsibility is commendable, it does not cure the jurisprudential
dilemma presented by criminal prosecutions of fictional entities.3
Current standards for assessing corporate criminal liability are not ju-
risprudentially sound because they ignore the distinguishing characteris-
tic of the criminal law: it punishes for intentional acts. This disregard is
not just a theoretical problem; it leads to misguided decisions as to
whether corporations should be prosecuted. Although the Guidelines
fail to address the fundamental problem of how we should assess corpo-
rate criminal liability, they do point to a resolution of it. By rewarding
good corporate citizenry, the Guidelines recognize what the current stan-
* © Copyright 1992 by Pamela H. Bucy.
** Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law, B.A. 1975, Austin College; J.D.
1978, Washington University School of Law; Assistant United States Attorney, E.D. Mo., Criminal
Division, 1980-1987.
1. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8Al.1 (comment.)
(Nov. 1992) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
2. Id. § 8C2.5.
3. Sources discussing this dilemma include HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMI-
NAL SANCTION 361-62 (1968); George F. Canfield, Corporate Responsibility for Crime, 14 COLUM.
L. REV. 469, 472-81 (1914); Brent Fisse, Restructuring Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retri-
bution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141 (1983); Joseph F. Francis, Criminal Responsi-
bility of the Corporation, 18 ILL. L. Rv. 305 (1924); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the
Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REy. 423 (1963);
Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on
Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 21 (1957); Leonard Orland, Reflections on Corpo-
rate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholarship, 17 AM. CRiM. L. Rv. 501 (1980); Develop-
ments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions,
92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1365-75 (1979) [hereinafter Developments].
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dards of corporate criminal liability do not: the feasibility of assessing
corporate intent.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the Guidelines and
discusses how they define and measure corporate culpability. Part II de-
scribes and critiques the current standards for assessing corporate crimi-
nal liability. Part III proposes a new standard of corporate criminal
liability that builds upon premises inherent in the Guidelines. Finally,
Part IV addresses the question of whether a need remains for a new stan-
dard of corporate criminal liability in light of the federal organizational
Sentencing Guidelines.
I. MEASURING CORPORATE CULPABILITY UNDER THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
Concerned about inconsistency in sentences imposed and variation in
sentences actually served,4 Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 ("Reform Act").5 With this statute Congress rejected the reha-
bilitative philosophy of punishment that had guided federal sentencing
standards for most of the twentieth century.6
Pre-Reform Act sentencing practices were based upon the philosophy
that society can and should rehabilitate criminals.7 To effectuate such
rehabilitation, criminals were individually evaluated, both when the sen-
tence was imposed and during service of the sentence. Such an individ-
ual evaluation is possible only if a court is accorded wide discretion in
imposing sentences and if the criminal is monitored during incarceration
to determine when rehabilitation has taken place. The federal criminal
4. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON S. 1762, COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT
OF 1983, S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225]. For a
compilation of sources discussing the disparity in pre-Guidelines sentencing, see William W. Wil-
kins, Jr., A Response to Judge Heaney, 29 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 795, 798 n.9 (1992). Some scholars
and practitioners support the view that the Guidelines have reduced sentencing disparity. Joe B.
Brown, The Sentencing Guidelines Are Reducing Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 875 (1992).
Others argue that the Sentencing Guidelines have not reduced the inconsistency and lack of predict-
ability in sentencing. See, eg., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea
for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991); Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: De-
bating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771 (1992).
5. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
6. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 39-40.
7. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 37-38; Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion:
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 894-95 (1990); Wil-
liam W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Approach to the Unwarranted
Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRiM. L.F. 355, 357 (1991).
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code provided sentencing courts with this discretion by delineating maxi-
mum sentences, limited in only a few instances by minimum sentences.
This sentencing structure permitted judges the discretion to impose a
wide span of sentences.8 Compounding this opportunity for disparate
sentencing is the inevitable problem that exists in any criminal code that
has evolved over hundreds of years-lack of internal consistency in the
crimes set forth.9
Under pre-Reform Act sentencing, rehabilitation of incarcerated de-
fendants was monitored by the United States Parole Commission, which
was given broad discretion to release prisoners who demonstrated suffi-
cient rehabilitation. Consequently, releases from prison were unpredict-
able-at the time of sentencing no one, not the judge, the prosecutor, the
victim(s), nor the defendant, knew how much of the sentence imposed
would actually be served. 10
Over the years, because of its inconsistency and unpredictability, ex-
perts and observers became disillusioned with the rehabilitation ap-
proach to sentencing." Rejection of the rehabilitative model for
sentencing corporate defendants has been especially long overdue. With
its emphasis on incarceration flexibility, rehabilitative theory is particu-
larly inappropriate for sentencing fictional entities that dannot be
imprisoned.
In passing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress directed that
judges should no longer impose prison sentences with a view toward re-
habilitation, but rather with the multiple goals of imposing just punish-
ment, deterring future crime, protecting the public, and providing a
criminal with effective treatment and training.12 Congress also estab-
lished a sentencing commission to set forth mandatory guidelines for
judges to use in sentencing criminals. 3 Since beginning full-time service
8. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 39-40; Wilkins, supra note 4, at 797.
9. S. RP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 39-40; Wilkins et al., supra note 7, at 365-66.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027
(1984) (giving the Parole Commission power to promulgate guidelines regarding parole of those
incarcerated). See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 2; S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 46-49; Nagel,
supra note 7, at 895; Wilkins et al., supra note 7, at 362-63.
11. S. Rap. No. 225, supra note 4, at 40 & n.16; Wilkins et al., supra note 7, at 357-58, 362.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988). Some critics suggest that the emphasis in the Guidelines has
shifted too greatly by assigning punishment based upon the victim's harm rather than the defend-
ant's characteristics. See, eg., Alschuler, supra note 4, at 908-09; Heaney, supra note 4, at 783-84;
Marc Miller, True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 587, 607-08 (1992).
13. Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission to:
establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that...
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in 198514 the United States Sentencing Commission (the "Sentencing
Commission") has promulgated Sentencing Guidelines for individuals
and organizations convicted of all but a few crimes.
The Sentencing Guidelines for organizations were among the last
guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission. They became ef-
fective on November 1, 1991, and apply to organizations found guilty of
committing crimes after this date. 5 The Guidelines provide the sentenc-
ing judge with a variety of options when sentencing a convicted organiza-
tion: restitution, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, probation, and fines. 6
In determining the amount of an organizational fine, the court first as-
sesses a "base fine," determined by reference to a schedule of crimes. 7
The court then adjusts the base fine by considering the organization's
level of culpability. Culpability is measured by the organization's con-
duct: whether the organization maintained an "effective" program to
prevent and detect criminal violations; whether it voluntarily disclosed
corporate wrongdoing; whether it fully cooperated with government in-
vestigators. i8 By engaging in such acts of "corporate good citizenship,"
an organization may reduce its base fine by as much as ninety-five per-
cent. At the other extreme, if the organization failed to engage in such
acts of corporate responsibility and if its high-level personnel participated
in, condoned, or were willfully ignorant of or tolerated the criminal ac-
tivity, a convicted organization's base fine could increase by as much as
400%. 19
In giving organizations credit for encouraging law-abiding behavior
among its employees and, conversely, by severely punishing those organi-
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in
the establishment of general sentencing practices.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
14. Nagel, supra note 7, at 884.
15. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8A1.1 (comment.).
16. Id. § 8B (Introductory comment.).
17. Id. § 8C2.4.
18. Id § 8C2.5.
19. For example, if a court convicts an organization of defrauding an individual of $100,000
and initially assesses the fine under § 8C2.4 at $100,000, the corporation may reduce the fine to a
range of $5000-$20,000 by qualifying for the lowest possible "culpability score" under § 8C2.5. On
the other hand, if the organization qualifies for the highest possible "culpability score" under
§ 8C2.5, its fine would range from $200,000 to $400,000. See id. § 8C2.6 (minimum and maximum
multipliers).
[Vol. 71:329
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zations that encourage unlawful conduct, the Guidelines make several
assumptions that provide the groundwork for devising a jurisprudentially
sound standard of corporate criminal liability. The Guidelines assume
that each organization is different and should be treated differently; that
it is possible to assess an organization's culpability by examining its inter-
nal policies and procedures; and, that it is wise to reward corporations
which encourage law-abiding behavior.
II. ASSESSING THE CURRENT STANDARDS OF CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
American jurisprudence currently employs two major standards to de-
termine organizational criminal liability. Both standards impose vicari-
ous liability2" by imputing the criminal acts and intent of corporate
agents to the corporation. The "traditional" or "respondeat superior"
standard is a common-law rule developed primarily in the federal courts
and adopted by some state courts.21 Derived from agency principles in
tort law,22 this standard provides that a corporation "may be held crimi-
nally liable for the acts of any of its agents [who] (1) commit[ ] a crime
(2) within the scope of employment (3) with the intent to benefit the
corporation. '2 3 As construed by most courts, the latter two require-
ments are almost meaningless.24 Courts deem an agent's criminal con-
duct to be "within the scope of employment" even when corporate policy
specifically forbids such conduct and the corporation has made a good-
faith effort to discourage such behavior.25 Similarly, courts deem crimi-
nal conduct by an agent to be "with the intent to benefit the corporation"
20. Vicarious liability occurs when a court holds B liable for an act of A "although B has
played no part in it, has done nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he
possibly can to prevent it." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984). Vicarious liability is sometimes called imputed liability and "is
given the Latin name of respondeat superior." IL
21. James V. Dolan & Richard S. Rebeck, Note, Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor Acts in Viola-
tion of Company Policy, 50 GEo. L.J. 547, 547-51 (1962). States that have adopted the traditional
respondeat superior standard of liability include Indiana, see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-3 (Bums
1985), and Kansas, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3206 (1971).
22. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909).
23. Developments, supra note 3, at 1247. See also Dolan & Rebeck, supra note 21, at 547-48
(arguing that courts have gone beyond vicarious liability in holding corporations criminally liable for
actions of their employees when the corporations have general policies prohibiting such acts).
24. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability,
75 MINN. L. REv. 1095, 1148-50 (1991).
25. 1 KATHLEEN F. BRIcKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 3:01 (2d ed. 1991); Devel-
opments, supra note 3, at 1249-50.
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even when the corporation received no actual benefit from the offense
and no one else within the corporation knew of the criminal conduct at
the time it occurred.26 With these latter two requirements thus weak-
ened, a court may hold a corporation criminally liable whenever one of
its agents (even an independent contractor in some circumstances) com-
mits a crime related in almost any way to the agent's employment.27
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code ("MPC") provides
the major alternative standard for assessing an organization's criminal
liability. Developed in the 1950s, the MPC provides three standards for
such liability.28 The type of criminal offense charged determines which
standard applies. For the majority of corporate crimes,29 the MPC pro-
vides that a corporation may be held criminally liable if the criminal con-
duct was "authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting
in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employ-
ment."30 This standard is still based upon a respondeat superior model,
but in a limited fashion-a corporation is criminally liable for the con-
duct of only some of its agents (directors, officers, or other higher eche-
lon employees).
The critical weakness in both the traditional respondeat superior and
MPC standards is that by automatically imputing the agent's criminal
liability to the corporation, they fail to consider the culpability of the
corporation itself. Two Fourth Circuit cases, United States v. Hilton Ho-
tels Corp. 31 and United States v. Basic Construction Co. ,32 aptly demon-
strate this. In United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp. , the purchasing
26. BRICKEY, supra note 25, § 4:02; Developments, supra note 3, at 1250.
27. Bucy, supra note 24, at 1148-50.
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
29. The MPC includes two additional standards of corporate liability. Section 2.07(1)(a) ap-
plies to minor infractions and non-Code penal offenses "in which a legislative purpose to impose
liability on corporations plainly appears." Id. § 2.07(1)(a). Section 2.07(1)(a) is a broad respondeat
superior standard because a court will hold a corporation liable whenever "the conduct is performed
by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or
employment." Id. Section 2.07(1)(b) applies to omissions and provides strict liability for the corpo-
ration that fails to discharge a "specific duty" imposed on corporations by law. Id. § 2.07(l)(b).
For an excellent discussion of the tension created by these multiple standards of liability, espe-
cially between §§ 2.07(l)(a) and 2.07(l)(c), see Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability
Under the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593, 604-11 (1988).
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(l)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
31. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
32. 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 956, 1008 (1983).
33. 467 F.2d 1000.
[Vol. 71:329
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agent at a Hilton Hotel in Portland, Oregon threatened a supplier of
goods with the loss of the hotel's business if the supplier did not contrib-
ute to an association created to attract conventions to Portland.34 Hilton
Hotel's president testified that such action was contrary to corporate pol-
icy.35 Moreover, the manager and assistant manager of the Portland
Hilton Hotel testified that they specifically told the purchasing agent not
to threaten suppliers.36 Nevertheless, the court convicted Hilton Hotels
of antitrust violations under the respondeat superior standard of
liability.37
In United States v. Basic Construction Co. ,38 the court found the de-
fendant corporation liable for bid rigging on state road paving contracts.
The bid rigging was conducted by "two relatively minor officials, . . .
[was] done without the knowledge of high level corporate officers," and
was in violation of the company's "longstanding, well known, and
strictly enforced policy against bid rigging."' 39 Basic objected to the trial
court's instruction informing the jury that a "corporation may be respon-
sible for the action of its agents... even though the conduct of the agents
may be contrary to the corporation's actual instructions, or contrary to
the corporation's stated position."'  Basic argued that this instruction
allowed the jury to "fix absolute criminal liability on a corporation for
acts done by its employees"41 and that this relieved the government from
proving that the corporation "had an intent separate from that of its
lower level employees to violate the antitrust laws."' 2 The Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected Basic's argument by noting that the law allowed exactly
what Basic complained of-absolute criminal liability of corporations for
acts committed by corporate agents.4 3
The failure of the traditional respondeat superior and the MPC stan-
34. Id. at 1002.
35. Id. at 1004.
36. Id.
37. Id. The court noted that "Congress may constitutionally impose criminal liability upon a
business entity for acts or omissions of its agents within the scope of their employment." Id.
38. 711 F.2d 570.
39. Ido at 572.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 572-73.
42. Id. at 573.
43. Id. at 573 (citing United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d at 1004-07; United States
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174,204-05 (3d Cir. 1970), cert denied,
401 U.S. 948 (1971); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981)).
1993]
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dards to focus on corporate intent is antithetical to the criminal law. The
mens rea requirement is essential to a fair application of criminal justice.
It serves at least three functions: it enhances social stability; it promotes
more consistent and more appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion; and it facilitates planning by potential defendants-including efforts
by potential defendants to comply with the law.
Requiring proof of criminal intent as a prerequisite for criminal liabil-
ity enhances social stability by promoting voluntary compliance with the
law." For laws to succeed in promoting social stability, the vast major-
ity of citizens must comply with them.45 Resources are not available, nor
should they be, to fuel the large law enforcement machine that universal
lawlessness would require. Voluntary compliance will wane, however, if
the law is viewed as unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. The law will be so per-
ceived if it punishes A for acts that occur despite A's best effort to avoid
such conduct (strict liability)," or it punishes A for what B did even
when A had no knowledge of B's behavior (vicarious liability).47 The
criminal intent requirement avoids both of these possibilities by narrow-
ing liability to voluntary acts committed by a defendant."a
Realistically, a few exceptions of strict or vicarious liability will not so
44. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 50 (1968) (explaining that people obey
the law "because it offers a guarantee that the antisocial minority who would not otherwise obey will
be coerced into obedience by fear").
45. According to Hart, "two minimum conditions" are
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand those rules of
behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be
generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of
legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as com-
mon public standards of official behaviour by its officials.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 113 (1961).
46. "Strict liability... means liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either.., an
intent ... or... a breach of duty... This is often referred to as liability without fault." KEETON
ET AL., supra note 20, § 75, at 534.
47. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 8.5, at 647 (1978) ("That liability is
'vicarious' simply expresses the conclusion that the defendant will be held liable for the acts of
another.").
48. H.L.A. Hart discusses this point when he distinguishes characteristics that separate legal
rules from moral rules. Hart notes that a person who involuntarily abridges a moral rule "is excused
from moral responsibility, and to blame him in these circumstances would itself be considered mor-
ally objectionable." HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 45, at 173. In contrast, Hart notes
that with objective standards of mens rea and notions such as strict liability, an individual can invol-
untarily violate a legal rule and a court will still hold the person legally responsible. Although Hart
acknowledges this distinction, he cautions that "[iun any developed legal system," the mens rea re-
quirement must be an "element in criminal responsibility" for "[a] legal system would be open to
serious moral condemnation if this were not so." Id. at 173-74.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/4
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greatly taint the public's perception of the criminal justice system so as to
substantially curtail voluntary compliance. Extending these exceptions
to most offenses, however, creates such a risk. Because vicarious liability
currently is the universal rule of liability seen by the group of people
most directly affected by corporate criminal liability, namely, corporate
executives, these individuals may view the criminal justice system as un-
reasonable and unfair--and choose to disregard it.
Requiring proof of criminal intent before imposing criminal liability
serves a second function: it enhances consistent enforcement of the law.
The current, broad, vicarious liability standards for charging organiza-
tions with crimes offer prosecutors little guidance as to which of the
many corporations that fall within the literal terms of these standards
should be charged. Between 1984 and 1987, an average of 320 corpora-
tions per year were convicted of crimes." 9 Surely there were more corpo-
rations than this which broke the law and are liable under the current
standards of corporate criminal liability. What this statistic really repre-
sents is the wide discretion prosecutors exercise when deciding which
corporations to charge.
Because resources do not exist to prosecute every offending corpora-
tion that meets our current standards of organizational criminal liability,
prosecutors must pick and choose which organizations to prosecute.50
Assuming, arguendo, that prosecutors responsibly attempt to make the
decision whether to charge an organization, individual prosecutors must
resort to their personal, and therefore variable, views on whether to in-
dict a corporation. Forcing prosecutors to select cases based on corpo-
49. Mark A. Cohen et al., Organizations as Defendants in Federal Court: A Preliminary Analy-
sis of Prosecutions, Convictions, and Sanctions, 1984-1987, 10 WHITTIER L. REv. 103 (1988). This
study of federal prosecutions showed that organizational prosecutions accounted for fewer than one
percent of all federal criminal prosecution. Id. at 111.
50. Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L.
532, 533-34 (1970); Orland, supra note 3, at 511 ("Thousands of corporate crime statutes are enacted
by Congress but relatively few are actively enforced by federal prosecutors."); James Vorenburg,
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1525, 1548-49 (1981). Vorenburg
notes that "prosecutors increasingly have been forced to allocate resources by deciding whether to
charge and whether to offer leniency in exchange for guilty pleas." Id. at 1525. See also Jed S.
Rakoff, The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Business Fraud Prosecutions, in CORRIGI-
BLE CORPORATIONS AND UNRULY LAW 173 (Brent Fisse & Peter A. French eds., 1985) (detailing
numerous policies and guidelines that prosecutors follow when deciding whether to prosecute).
51. Constitutional and ethical restrictions, as well as Department of Justice guidelines and cus-
toms, limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on
Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Undertaking and Transcending the Crimi-
nal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991); see generally Rakoff, supra note 50. The
1993]
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rate criminal intent, however, curtails this broad discretion and decreases
the potential for abuse and arbitrariness. Furthermore, focusing corpo-
rate criminal prosecutions on organizations with criminal intent wisely
utilizes scarce prosecutorial resources.
The third major function served by the criminal intent requirement is
that it allows potential defendants to better predict and plan their fu-
tures. Under the broad vicarious liability standards of respondeat supe-
rior and the MPC, a corporation has no way of predicting whether an
individual prosecutor will seek criminal charges against it for any given
crime. However, when a corporation knows that criminal liability de-
pends upon its own voluntary acts, it can better plan and predict its fu-
ture52 by choosing whether to engage in activities that limit or expand its
exposure to criminal liability. Thus, by standardizing prosecutorial deci-
sions, the criminal intent requirement allows corporate executives to as-
sess more accurately the costs of engaging in unlawful behavior.
In summary, because corporations are and historically have been con-
victed of criminal offenses without an assessment of intent, those most
affected by this standard of liability, corporate executives, see the crimi-
nal law at its worst. They see the criminal law used arbitrarily, with no
guidance for prosecutors, no direction for businesses that wish to plan
ahead, and no incentive for corporations to engage in law-abiding
behavior.
III. A PROPOSED STANDARD OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A focus on the individual actor pervades our jurisprudence on intent.5 3
To date, our approach to corporate criminal liability has been to impute
exercise of such discretion, however, remains within "one's own considered judgment and con-
science." Id at 171; see also Vorenberg, supra note 50 (arguing that current restraints on
prosecutorial discretion are insufficient).
52. See HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 44, at 23. Hart notes that a
system that punishes for unintentional conduct means that individuals will "have their plans frus-
trated by punishments for what they do unintentionally, in ignorance, by accident or mistake. Such
a system... would diminish the individual's power to identify beforehand particular periods during
which he will be free from [punishment]." Id See also id. at 181-82 (asserting that a system that
punishes only voluntary acts permits individuals to determine their own fates).
53. As Australian Reader-in-Law Brent Fisse notes: "Modem corporate criminal law owes its
origin and design more to crude borrowings from individual criminal and civil law than to any
coherent assessment of the objectives of corporate criminal law and of how those objectives might be
attained." Fisse, supra note 3, at 1143; see also id at 1143 n.1 (listing other American, British, and
Australian literature "recognizing the unsystematic historical development of corporate criminal
law").
[V/ol. 71:329
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an individual actor's criminal intent to the corporation. This approach is
not only inadequate, but also harmful to the integrity and power of the
criminal law.5 4 With the rising prominence of corporate actors, courts
and legislatures must develop the concept of intent beyond the context of
individual actors to focus on corporate intent. Such a focus should begin
by acknowledging that each organization has an identifiable character or
"ethos." Before convicting an organization, the government should be
required to prove that the organization's "ethos" encouraged the corpo-
ration's agents to commit the criminal act.
In a sense, this standard takes its cue from notions of intent developed
in the context of individual liability. When considering whether an indi-
vidual should be held criminally liable, we ask whether the person com-
mitted the act accidentally or purposely. If the individual committed the
act purposely, we consider it to be a crime, while if the individual com-
mitted the act accidentally, we do not. Similarly, the corporate ethos
standard imposes criminal liability on a corporation only if the corpora-
tion encouraged the criminal conduct at issue. If it did, the criminal
conduct is not an accident or the unpredictable act of a maverick em-
ployee. Instead, the criminal conduct is predictable and consistent with
corporate goals, policies, and ethos. In the context of a fictional entity,
this translates into intention.
If the corporate ethos standard represents a more jurisprudentially
sound use of the criminal law, one may wonder why courts or legisla-
tures have not adopted such a standard. At least three possible explana-
tions exist. The first is precedent. American jurisprudence has never
employed anything but strict, vicarious liability in assessing an organiza-
tion's criminal liability. Yet an examination of precedent reveals that
courts adopted and perpetuated this standard with little analysis of its
jurisprudential soundness. As O.W. Mueller noted, "[m]any weeds have
grown on the acre of jurisprudence which has been allotted to the crimi-
nal law. Among these... is corporate criminal liability .... Nobody
bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew." 5
The Supreme Court's opinion in New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad v. United States 56 sheds light on this growth. Not only is New
York Central the premier decision establishing criminal liability for cor-
54. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rav. 193 (1991).
55. Mueller, supra note 3, at 21.
56. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
19931
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porations in American law, 57 but its flawed and outdated reasoning ex-
emplifies subsequent courts' analysis of corporate criminal liability.5"
The New York Central Railroad employed an assistant traffic manager
who gave "rebates" on railroad rates to certain railroad users. As a re-
sult, the effective shipping rate for these users was less than the mandated
rates.59 The federal trial court held New York Central Railroad crimi-
nally liable under bribery statutes for the acts of its assistant traffic man-
ager.' Noting that the principle of respondeat superior was well
established in civil tort law, the Supreme Court stated that "every reason
in public policy" justified "go[ing] only a step farther" and applying re-
spondeat superior to criminal law.6" Based upon this rationale, the
Court established the traditional respondeat superior standard of crimi-
nal liability for corporations.62
The Court's reasoning in New York Central contains three major flaws
which subsequent courts have perpetuated and exacerbated. First, the
Court failed to appreciate the difference between civil and criminal law.
The only indication that the Court recognized such a difference was
when it disregarded it, stating "we see no good reason" for not applying
the civil concept of respondeat superior to criminal corporate liability.63
Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in affirming the
conviction of a utilities corporation, stated that "[i]f the act was.., done
[by a corporate employee] it will be imputed to the corporation ...
There is no longer any distinction in essence between the civil and crimi-
nal liability of corporations, based upon the element of intent or wrongful
purpose.""
The second flaw in the New York Central reasoning is its failure to
consider civil alternatives to corporate criminal liability. The Court
stated that failure to impose criminal liability on corporations would
57. Dolan & Rebeck, supra note 21, at 548.
58. For other analyses critical of the New York Central reasoning, see Francis, supra note 3, at
313, 315, 320-23; Orland, supra note 3, at 502-04; Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punish-
ment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REv. 307, 311 (1991).
59. 212 U.S. at 489-90.
60. The trial court fined New York Central & Hudson River Railroad $18,000 on each of six
counts for a total fine of $108,000. The court fined the assistant manager $1000 on each of the six
counts for a total fine of $6000. Ia at 490.
61. Id. at 493-95.
62. Id. at 494.
63. Id.
64. Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369, 379 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943).
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"virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject
matter and correcting the abuses aimed at."6 This conclusion ignores
the two major options to imposing criminal liability upon corporations:
(1) criminal liability of the responsible individuals within the corpora-
tion,66 and (2) civil remedies against the corporation,67 both of which are
probably more viable methods of controlling behavior today than they
were in 1909 when the Court decided New York Central. Nevertheless,
without assessing the development, success, or greater propriety of these
alternatives, subsequent courts have continued to rely on this rationale in
imposing criminal liability on corporate entities. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in affirming the
conviction of a corporate wholesaler of fruits and vegetables for evading
price regulations, noted that not to impose criminal liability in this case
was "to immunize the offender.",68
The third flaw in the New York Central reasoning is its failure to con-
sider the conceptual alternatives to respondeat superior as the standard
for corporate criminal liability. The Supreme Court assumed it had only
two options for imposing criminal liability on corporations: respondeat
superior69 or no criminal liability.70  Such a rigid view of its available
options is understandable given the posture of the case (the Court was
dealing with a strict liability statute) and the historical setting of this
opinion. Courts have extended the rationale of New York Central be-
yond the context of strict liability statutes, however, and almost a full
century has passed since it was decided. During this time, there has been
65. 212 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added).
66. Brickey, supra note 29, at 621-22; Canfield, supra note 3, at 472.
67. Developments, supra note 3, at 1301-11.
68. United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
869 (1946).
69. In this case, a court could hold New York Central liable for acts of its assistant traffic
manager because of the language in the Elkins Act, which provided a broad respondeat superior
standard. The Elkins Act provided:
In construing and enforcing the provisions of this section the act, omission, or failure of
any officer, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any common carrier acting
within the scope of his employment shall in every case be also deemed to be the act, omis-
sion, or failure of such carrier as well as that of the person.
49 U.S.C. § 41(2) (1906), repealed by Interstate Commerce Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(a),
(b), 92 Stat. 1466, 1470, quoted in New York Central, 212 U.S. at 496.
70. In 1909, the question whether corporations should be liable for crimes of intent was seri-
ously debated. Compare BRICKEY, supra note 25, § 4.01 (stating that only certain classes of crimes
could be committed by corporations) with Canfield, supra note 3, at 472-77 (discussion published in
1914 of whether a corporation could be liable for crimes requiring knowledge or intent).
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considerable experience with and substantial scholarship on the nature of
organizations. The New York Central Court's simplistic choice between
two options, while understandable, ignores the subtleties of organiza-
tional behavior that today's courts are better able to identify and appreci-
ate. Thus, in this early effort to impose criminal liability on fictional
entities, the Supreme Court gave as precedent a sledgehammer when a
scalpel is needed. As in other areas where sophisticated tools have re-
placed primitive ones, the criminal law needs a more sophisticated and
refined mechanism for imposing corporate criminal liability.
Another possible reason that our standards for assessing an organiza-
tion's criminal liability have not evolved to include an assessment of cor-
porate mens rea is the perception that such an assessment is not possible.
Yet it is, theoretically and practically. The strongest evidence of the
workability of such a standard for assessing corporate criminal liability is
the willingness of the United States Sentencing Commission to focus on
organizational culpability and its demonstration of how to do so. In re-
quiring that any criminal fine assessed against an organization be based,
in part, on the organization's "culpability," the Guidelines demonstrate
the viability of identifying corporate intent.71 By directing courts to ex-
amine factors such as involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity,
commission of prior criminal offenses, cooperation with the government
in its investigation of the criminal conduct, and existence of effective in-
ternal programs to prevent and detect violations of the law,72 the Guide-
lines point the way to identifying corporate intent.
The Guidelines are not the first effort to identify corporate intent.
During the past twenty years or so, as organizations increasingly have
been targets of criminal and civil lawsuits, jurists and scholars have
demonstrated their willingness to identify the intent, or ethos, of fictional
entities. For example, in assessing municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides that persons, including fictional persons, who de-
prive citizens of certain rights are liable to the injured person,73 courts
repeatedly focus on the intent of municipal organizations as manifested
71. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5.
72. Id.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person [including fictional persons] who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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by their policies. In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Serv-
ices,' the Supreme Court held that section 1983 clearly envisions liabil-
ity of municipal corporations "only where the municipality itself causes
the constitutional violation at issue."" Rather than employing tradi-
tional respondeat superior theory, whereby a corporation would be found
liable for an employee's isolated act,76 section 1983, like the corporate
ethos standard for corporate criminal liability, provides for a "faultbased
analysis for imposing... liability."77 Such an analysis requires courts to
focus on the municipal "custom" or "policy"7 which is the "moving
force" 79 of the constitutional deprivation. Under section 1983, liability is
imposed only if the evidence shows that "some official policy] 'causes' an
employee to violate another's constitutional rights.""0 Thus, since at
least the Monell decision in 1978, courts and juries have worked with
and applied the notion that a fictional entity assumes responsibility for
acts of its agents only when it employs an internal custom or policy that
encourages such violations."1
74. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
75. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95). The
Monell Court overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and held that "persons" within
§ 1983 includes municipal corporations. 436 U.S. at 690, 701.
76. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ("In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor--or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.").
77. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818 (1985).
78. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
79. Id. at 694.
80. Id. at 692.
81. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 385; City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S.
257, 267 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Although this line of cases, like the corporate ethos
standard of liability, reflects the view that fictional entities are capable of promulgating a policy or
custom for which a court should hold the entity itself liable, they do not clearly reflect a mechanism
for determining the policy or custom.
The Monell Court did not require a showing of "formal approval through the body's official deci-
sionmaking channels" before finding the existence of a policy subjecting a municipality to § 1983
liability. 436 U.S. at 690-91. In later cases, however, the Court appears to require just that. In
Tuttle, the Court found an isolated incident by a single low-level officer insufficient to subject a
municipality to liability. 471 U.S. at 824. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), the
Court found the four-word response by a single county employee (a county prosecutor) sufficient to
constitute county policy. Id. at 484-85. The Court's discussions in both cases focused on formal
aspects of the decisionmaking process. In Tuttle, the Court emphasized the lack of involvement by
official policymakers. 471 U.S. at 821-23. In Pembaur, the Court focused on the prosecutor's au-
thority as described in state statutes. 475 U.S. at 484-85.
In contrast, the corporate ethos standard emphasizes many aspects of a corporation's structure
when identifying corporate ethos, custom or policy. The formal decisionmaking process and the
status of participants involved in the activity constitute only two relevant factors.
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Perhaps the most direct example of courts' willingness to consider cor-
porate intent is the use of the concept of "collective intent." United
States v. Bank of New England 82 exemplifies this concept. The Bank of
New England was convicted on thirty-one counts of violating 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5313 and 5322 for failing to file Currency Transaction Reports
("CTRs") on cash transactions of more than $10,000.83 On thirty-one
occasions, James McDonough, a bank customer, withdrew more than
$10,000 in cash from a single account by simultaneously presenting mul-
tiple checks in sums less than $10,000 to a single bank teller.8 4
Acknowledging that under applicable law a corporation's criminal in-
tent is imputed from an agent's intent, the bank argued that it was not
liable because no one bank employee had sufficient criminal intent of Mc-
Donough's transactions.85 In other words, according to the bank, the
teller who conducted the McDonough transactions did not know that the
law required the filing of CTRs when a customer withdraws $10,000
from a single account using multiple checks all of which are less than
$10,000, and the bank employee who knew of the CTR requirement did
not know of the McDonough transactions. Thus, according to the bank,
there was no single bank employee with sufficient mens rea to impute to
the corporation. The court rejected the bank's argument, and gave an
instruction to the jury describing "collective intent":
[You have to look at the bank as an institution. As such, its knowledge is
the sum of the knowledge of all of the employees. That is, the bank's
knowledge is the totality of what all of the employees know within the
scope of their employment.8 6
By employing the notion of "collective intent," courts are, in effect, rec-
ognizing the existence of an organizational identity that exceeds the sum
of its parts and exists independently of the individuals who work for it.
Law developing in other countries has begun to require a finding of
corporate intent before holding corporations criminally liable. In several
instances Dutch courts, for example, have held a corporation criminally
liable if, but only if, the organization itself has demonstrated culpabil-
ity.8 7 To assess culpability, the Dutch courts have looked to the corpora-
82. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
83. Id at 847.
84. Id
85. Id. at 855-56.
86. Id. at 855.
87. Stewart Field & Nico Jiirg, Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: Should We be Going
Dutch?, 1991 CRIM. L. REv. 156, 163-71.
[Vol. 71:329
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/4
1993] THE GUIDELINES: THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE
tion's efforts, or lack of efforts, to remedy the situation that led to the
criminal conduct. In a 1981 case, Kabeljauw, 8 a Dutch court acquitted
a corporate shipowner on criminal charges that it had violated shipping
regulations when one of its vessels caught prohibited species of animals.
Both the trial and appellate courts based their decisions of acquittal on
the fact that the corporation had taken affirmative steps to prohibit such
unlawful fishing by equipping its ships with nets specially designed for
fishing only permitted species.8 9 Likewise, in 1987, a Dutch appellate
court affirmed the first conviction of a corporation for manslaughter
based upon a finding of numerous instances of poor monitoring by a hos-
pital of its equipment and employees, which led to the death of a
patient.90
Australian law currently follows the MPC approach of imposing crim-
inal liability on corporations if the conduct was committed by higher
echelon corporate agents. 91 The Attorneys General of Australia, how-
ever, have suggested legislation that would amend this standard to also
hold criminally liable any organization that "expressly, tacitly or im-
pliedly authorized or permitted the commission of the offense."'92 Such
authorization or permission could be proven by showing that a "corpo-
rate culture existed within the body corporate that directed, encouraged,
tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision or that the
body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that
required compliance with the relevant provision."93 The proposed legis-
lation defines corporate culture as "an attitude, policy, rule, course of
conduct or practice existing within the body corporate." 94
In explaining the rationale for moving from the current standard
which focuses only on vicarious liability to one that also focuses on an
organization's culpability, the Attorneys General found that the strict
liability approach was "no longer appropriate" and indicated that it was
striving to deal with organizational blameworthiness by developing
88. Hoge Raad, July 1, 1981, N.J. 1982, 80 (summarized in Field & J6rg, supra note 87, at
164).
89. Id.
90. Hospital Case, Rechtbank Leeuwarden, Dec. 23, 1987, partially reported at N.J. 1988, 981
(summarized in Field & Jbrg, supra note 87, at 158, 164-65).
91. Standing Committee of Attorneys General, Criminal Law Officers Committee, Model Crim-
inal Code, Discussion Draft 95 (July 1992).
92. Id § 501.2.
93. Id. § 501.2.1.
94. Id. § 501.2.2.
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"rules which fairly adapt the general principles of criminal responsibility
to the complexities of the corporate form."95
Assessment of corporate intent is not only theoretically sound, but
making such an assessment is practicable, workable, and provable from
concrete information already available in grand jury investigations of
corporate crime. To ascertain the ethos of a corporation, and to deter-
mine whether this ethos encouraged the criminal conduct at issue, the
factfinder would examine the following corporate policies and proce-
dures: (1) the corporate hierarchy; (2) the corporation's goals and poli-
cies; (3) the corporation's historical treatment of prior offenses; (4) the
corporation's efforts to educate and monitor employees' compliance with
the law; and (5) the corporation's compensation scheme, especially its
policy on indemnification of corporate employees.
Not only is access to these facts obtainable through a grand jury inves-
tigation of corporate activity, but such facts are subject to proof in court.
For example, inquiry into corporate hierarchy would begin with the
board of directors' role. Does the board operate as a figurehead or does
it monitor the corporation's efforts to comply with the law? If the board
or any board member allegedly performs this function, does the board or
the member have effective access and resources? In addition to examin-
ing the board of directors' role, the factfinder should also examine man-
agement's organizational structure. As Professor Braithwaite has stated:
"The key to understanding so much organizational crime... is the way
that organizational complexity can be used to protect people from ...
exposure to criminal liability." '96 The factfinder should focus on whether
management left unmonitored or inaccessible positions within the corpo-
ration where illegal behavior could have occurred easily. If positions
were left unattended, the factfinder should scrutinize the reason: was the
oversight an honest error in judgment or was it a callous recognition that
if corporate employees commit illegal activity, it is best done outside the
usual channels of supervision? Intentional gaps in the corporate hierar-
chy that allowed the criminal conduct to occur would weigh in favor of
finding a corporation criminally liable. On the other hand, a finding that
a corporation's organizational structure provides for effective supervision
of all aspects of the organization weighs against finding a corporation
95. Id at 95 (comment. to § 501).
96. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 147 (1989).
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criminally liable, even though corporate agents committed the criminal
act.
When considering the corporate goals, the factfinder should examine
whether the goals set for the relevant division, subsidiary, or employee
promote lawful behavior or implicitly encourage illegal behavior. As the
American Law Institute noted in devising the Model Penal Code's stan-
dard of corporate criminal liability, "the economic pressures within the
corporate body [may be] sufficiently potent to tempt individuals to haz-
ard personal liability for the sake of company gain."9 7
In some corporations, employees have the opportunity to disobey or to
comply with the law many times each day. These corporations have a
greater duty to educate their employees about legal requirements than do
corporations where employees do not have such opportunities. Likewise,
a corporation's duty to educate its employees about legal requirements
varies with the type of employee involved. For example, few would disa-
gree that a banking corporation has a duty to educate all of its tellers
about reporting requirements for cash transactions, but that it has no
duty to so educate its janitorial employees. The factflnder, therefore,
should consider whether the corporation has made reasonable efforts to
educate its employees about legal requirements. Relevant inquiries in as-
sessing these efforts include: (1) Whether the corporation informed the
appropriate employees of regulatory changes that affect their duties; (2)
Whether the corporation explained new regulations in a comprehensible
manner; (3) Whether middle management executives held regular meet-
ings to discuss problems of compliance; (4) Whether the corporation
made its legal staff available for discussions on compliance; and (5)
Whether middle management attended or held specific training programs
on ethics and government regulation.
In a study of corporations conducted by Marshall Clinard, middle
level managers cited effective employee monitoring as one of the prac-
tices important in cultivating an ethical corporation.98 A factfinder ap-
plying the corporate ethos standard should determine how effectively the
corporation monitors employee compliance with applicable legal require-
ments. To determine effectiveness, the factfinder should ask: (1) Does
the company conduct internal audits? (2) Does the corporation maintain
open channels of communication throughout the management hierarchy?
97. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comments § 2.07, at 148-49 Crentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
98. MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHics AND CRIME 159 (1983).
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(3) Does the corporation require employees to sign an annual statement
indicating that they are familiar with pertinent government regulations
and acknowledging that they realize such violations will result in dismis-
sal? (4) Does the corporation have an ombudsman?
The factfinder also should determine who committed the criminal vio-
lation, who contributed to its success, and which (if any) higher echelon
officials "recklessly tolerated" the offense. At this point, the corporate
ethos standard deviates from current vicarious liability standards for cor-
porate criminal liability. Under traditional respondeat superior doctrine,
if a corporate agent intentionally commits a criminal offense while acting
within the scope of her duties and for the benefit of the corporation, a
court will find the corporation itself guilty.9 9 Under the MPC standard,
if higher echelon officials participate in or recklessly tolerate the offense,
corporate liability results." Under the corporate ethos standard, how-
ever, such facts do not conclusively establish criminal liability. The gov-
ernment must go further to demonstrate that the corporation encouraged
such conduct. Admittedly, the chance of finding a corporate ethos that
encouraged the criminal conduct increases if higher echelon officials are
involved, but such officials' participation or acquiescence is not decisive.
Rather, the conduct of higher level officials is simply more relevant and
indicative of corporate intent than is the action of lower level officials.
According to Marshall Clinard's study, a corporation's reaction to a
prior violation of the law may be one of the more important factors en-
couraging ethical patterns in the corporation: "[P]rior enforcement ac-
tions ... not only affected compliance in the particular area in which
they were brought, but also had tended to affect compliance with govern-
ment regulations generally."101 The factfinder should consider the cor-
poration's prior treatment of employees who violated the law. Relevant
inquiries include: (1) Did the corporation discipline, or promote, the vio-
lators? (2) Did the corporation reimburse the violators for criminal or
civil fines assessed in their individual capacity or pay their attorneys'
fees? (3) What steps did the corporation take to prevent such action
from occurring again? (4) Did the corporation make efforts to rectify the
situation that led to the violations, or did it attempt to conceal the viola-
tions? If a corporation conscientiously and in good faith attempted to
99. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.10(a) (2d ed.
1986).
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
101. CLINARD, supra note 98, at 157-58.
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remove the cause of the prior violation, it is unlikely that an ethos existed
within that corporation that encouraged the criminal conduct. However,
if a corporation took few or no steps to remedy the situation that en-
couraged a violation, or if it attempted to conceal misconduct, a corpo-
rate ethos which promotes illegal behavior likely exists and should
subject the corporation to criminal liability.
One must concede to the critics of a "corporate intent" standard for
assessing criminal liability that we cannot fully, completely, and accu-
rately ascertain a corporate ethos. This is true, it is not possible. But if
we are candid we will admit the criminal law's requirement of proof of
mens rea has long imposed a factually impossible burden on the govern-
ment. We are accustomed to this burden, however, and so do not easily
realize that direct proof of intent is impossible and that we have simply
become comfortable with approximations that do not overcome the im-
possibility of our task. However, our inability to prove directly an indi-
vidual's intent does not cause us to reject the entire concept or, given
sufficient circumstantial evidence, to question whether the factfinders
have accurately deduced an individual's intent. So it is with corporate
ethos. When the government presents sufficient circumstantial evidence,
we can and should feel confident in the factflnders' deduction of a corpo-
ration's ethos.
The third major hurdle in adopting a standard of corporate criminal
liability that hinges upon finding corporate intent is the perception by
some that such a standard is "soft" on corporate crime. Certainly it is
expected that under such a standard, some corporations that are crimi-
nally liable under the current standards would not be liable, yet this is
because our current standards hold all corporations criminally liable for
crimes committed by their agents or, with the MPC, some of their
agents. To exempt from criminal liability law-abiding corporations that
make every effort to ensure that their employees follow the law is not
being "soft" on crime. It is using the criminal law wisely. Under a stan-
dard of criminal liability that focuses on corporate intent, the corpora-
tions that will be convicted are culpable and deserve punishment. Our
criminal justice resources will be saved for these corporations rather than
spent on corporations that have objectively and in good faith performed
as good corporate citizens.
1993]
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IV. ARE THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES A SUFFICIENT ANSWER To
THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY CURRENT STANDARDS FOR
ASSESSING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY?
If the Sentencing Guidelines for organizations and the corporate ethos
standard of corporate criminal liability both focus on a corporation's cul-
pability, has the Sentencing Commission remedied any unfairness or ju-
risprudential unsoundness caused by our current standards for assessing
corporate liability? Some scholars suggest this. These scholars focus on
problems caused by the "blurring" of civil and criminal liability, which is
typified by the imposition of criminal liability on organizations.
Professor Coffee attributes this blurring, in part, to the current law's
failure to focus on the criminal intent of the corporate actor."12 High-
lighting the need to differentiate between civil and criminal liability, Pro-
fessor Coffee reviews the components of our criminal justice system and
concludes that neither courts, nor legislatures, nor prosecutors can be
counted upon to decide when civil or criminal liability should be im-
posed.10 3 He concludes that the Sentencing Commission, through its
Guidelines, represents the "last, best hope" for the criminal justice sys-
tem to preserve the distinction between crimes and torts. 04
Professors Yellen and Mayer also address problems presented by the
blurring of civil and criminal liability.105 They emphasize that a criminal
conviction often triggers the imposition of severe civil and administrative
sanctions that are extremely disruptive, if not devastating, for the con-
victed organization. Noting that little effort has been made to coordinate
the imposition of criminal and collateral sanctions, they suggest that
such coordination take place at the criminal sentencing proceeding: "pu-
nitive collateral consequences ... [should] be considered in calibrating
the proper level of punishment for criminally convicted defendants."10 6
While both Professor Coffee's and Professors Yellen and Mayer's pro-
posals represent reasonable solutions to practical problems resulting
from the blurring of organizational civil and criminal liability, these pro-
posals address the effects, not the cause, of these problems. The cause is
the use of jurisprudentially unsound standards for assessing corporate
102. Coffee, supra note 54, at 239, 246.
103. Id. at 240-41.
104. Id. at 241-42, 246.
105. David Yellen & Carl J. Mayer, Coordinating Sanctions for Corporate Misconduct: Civil or
Criminal Punishment, 29 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 961 (1991).
106. Id. at 964.
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criminal liability. Solutions that fail to address the root of this problem
are doomed to be never-ending efforts to fix something that always
breaks.
There are four reasons we cannot rely on the jurisprudential soundness
of the Guidelines to remedy our defective standards for allocating corpo-
rate criminal liability. The first reason is the most abstract but most im-
portant. The power of the criminal law is diminished when criminal
liability is imposed for accidents or mistakes, regardless of how egregious
the consequences."07 As our world becomes more crowded, more stress-
ful, and more violent, society must have effective tools for dealing with
those who intentionally disregard societal rules. Properly used, the crim-
inal law is society's most powerful tool. It alone has the potential for
imposing the ultimate punishment and uniquely stigmatizing the of-
fender. To maintain the power of the criminal law, however, society
must acknowledge and protect its unique nature. When we convict ac-
tors, whether individuals or organizations, who have made every effort to
comply with the law, we have convicted without a finding of culpability.
This compromises the power of the criminal law. We must resist the
temptation to use criminal sanctions as a "quick fix" for problems that
are better handled through other responses. Although these alternative
responses may be more complex and work more slowly and less dramati-
cally, they may be more suited to unintentional violations of the law.
Failure to restrict our use of the criminal law to intentional violations
will squander the power of the criminal conviction.
The second reason is related: because our criminal justice system has
finite human, financial, and institutional resources, prosecuting one case
necessarily means that other criminal violations cannot be prosecuted.
Inappropriate prosecutions thus have a double cost-not only do they
weaken the impact of the criminal law, but they also divert scarce re-
sources from other cases. This double cost is especially high when the
107. But see Chris Tollefson, Ideologies Clashing: Corporations, Criminal Law, and the Regula-
tor Offence, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 705, 740 (1991) (suggesting that for regulatory offenses the
criminal law should move away from defining culpability in terms of moral fault and toward defining
culpability in terms of harm caused).
Presumably such an approach would, for example, make it easier for courts to impose criminal
liability on the corporation that pollutes-not because the corporation has acted intentionally, but
because of the "social costs" of its action. Cf. id at 741. Professor Tollefson correctly articulates
the view of those who advocate a focus on the harm caused rather than on corporate intent. Like
others following this view, Tollefson does not address issues such as the nature of the criminal law
and the costs of ignoring this nature when attempting to control these harms through criminal
sanctions.
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case pursued is complex and consumes more resources than most, which
is true of prosecutions of organizations.
The third reason not to rely simply upon the Sentencing Guidelines to
distinguish between organizations that deserve criminal liability and or-
ganizations that do not is the high cost of a conviction to a business
entity. Even for the organization that is able to reduce substantially its
criminal fine through the Guidelines' culpability factors, a criminal con-
viction carries high costs. There are out-of-pocket expenses in defending
the prosecution, such as attorneys' fees and travel and investigative ex-
penses. There are also indirect costs such as the loss of time and atten-
tion to business matters by corporate executives and corporate counsel
who must involve themselves in the criminal investigation and defense.
Other devastating costs may follow a conviction. Even if the sentencing
court reduces the criminal fine by applying the culpability factors, collat-
eral consequences may arise which the Guidelines cannot reduce.108 As
Professors Yellen and Mayer note,109 collateral consequences such as
suspension or elimination from governmental programs, 110 loss of profes-
sional licenses necessary to continue in business, 1 imposition of sub-
stantial administrative and civil fines, 12 termination of insurance,1 13 and
denial of applications for expansion may effectively ruin a corporation.
In addition to these collateral consequences, the convicted corporation
may face adverse publicity. In some instances adverse publicity alone
can cause corporate devastation, as when depositors flock to withdraw
108. The Guidelines instruct the sentencing court to consider civil or administrative collateral
consequences that a corporate defendant may face. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.8(a)(3). But the
sentencing court considirs collateral consequences only when assessing a particular fine within the
mandated fine range.
109. Professors Yellen and Mayer provide an excellent discussion of these collateral conse-
quences and the increasing frequency with which courts have imposed them. Yellen & Mayer, supra
note 105, at 962-1000.
110. See, eg., Federal Acquisition Regulations System (FARS), 48 C.F.R. § 9.400-.409 (1991)
(defense contractors); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1-.953 (1991) (Medicare and Medicaid providers).
111. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-37 (Michie Supp. 1992) (State Board of Medical Exam-
iners has authority to discipline a licensed physician upon a finding that, inter alia, the physician has
been convicted of a felony or has committed a crime involving moral turpitude); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 484.190 (1987) (authorizing the suspension or removal of any attorney convicted of "any criminal
offense involving moral turpitude").
112. See, eg., 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988) (establishing civil penalties of up to $10,000 for
each false claim submitted to the federal government plus treble damages).
113. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (Supp. III 1991) (regarding federally insured financial institutions).
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deposits from a convicted, or even indicted, financial institution.'14
There is, of course, nothing wrong with requiring an organization that
deserves prosecution to pay its legal expenses, or in imposing collateral
consequences on an organization that deserves conviction. To the con-
trary, coordination between the criminal justice system and the agencies
imposing the collateral consequences is commendable. The problem is
that under the current standards of corporate criminal liability, organiza-
tions that never should have been convicted in the first place will be sub-
jected to these collateral costs and consequences upon conviction. Such
organizations will derive little comfort from the fact that they can obtain
a reduction in their criminal fines under the Guidelines.
The fourth reason we cannot rely upon the Guidelines to cure our in-
appropriate use of the criminal law is that the Guidelines themselves may
cause adverse reactions within the convicted, or even within the indicted,
corporation. These reactions may occur as the corporate defendant
strives to obtain an optimal culpability score or if the court imposes cer-
tain conditions of probation on the corporation.
To obtain the best possible culpability score, a corporation must fully
cooperate with the government. This cooperation requires the corpora-
tion to disclose "all pertinent information known by the organiza-
tion."11 5 The comments to the Guidelines explain that "pertinent
information" is "information... sufficient for law enforcement personnel
to identify the nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s) re-
sponsible for the criminal conduct.""' 6 Thus, to obtain the lowest possi-
ble fine a corporation must, in effect, act as the government's agent in
interrogating corporate employees and in targeting employees for poten-
tial criminal prosecution. This type of cooperation with the government
creates a conflict of interest between the corporation, its corporate coun-
sel, and its employees. It may well demoralize employees and leave a
lasting adverse impact on a corporation that, under a corporate ethos
standard, would never have been indicted in the first place.
The Guidelines also provide that a sentencing court may place a con-
victed organization on probation. Conceivably, if not predictably, one
standard condition of probation will be requiring the organization to sub-
mit to interrogation of employees and examination of its books and
114. E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr., The New Guidelines, 2 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 1, 5 (Nov.
1991).
115. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 (comment. (n.12)).
116. Id.
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records by probation officers or court-appointed experts. 117 Again, for
the culpable corporation that encouraged criminal behavior by its em-
ployees, such a condition of probation is entirely proper. For the corpo-
ration that never should have been convicted, however, such monitoring
may not be constructive but may unnecessarily stigmatize a corporation
and waste corporate resources.
CONCLUSION
Standards for imposing criminal liability on organizations are a good
example of why jurisprudential soundness matters. Currently, the organ-
ization that takes every step possible to educate, motivate, and monitor
its employees to ensure that they follow the law may be criminally liable
when a maverick employee, acting against clear corporate policy, com-
mits a crime while employed by the organization. To acknowledge that
our current standards for holding corporations criminally liable have se-
rious problems is not tantamount to sympathizing with corporate
America. Rather, it is acknowledging that the criminal law has an essen-
tial character: to hold liable only those who intentionally engage in crim-
inal wrongdoing. Failure to recognize this essential character causes
specific, concrete problems for our criminal justice system. Prosecutors
have too little guidance as to which organizations they should prosecute.
Citizens (in this context, those who control organizations) are powerless
to take steps to guard against the imposition of criminal liability for the
organization. Lastly, the power of the criminal sanction is diminished.
Commendably, the Sentencing Guidelines provide a theoretical mech-
anism for assessing an organization's culpability and an incentive for cor-
porations to encourage employees to comply with the law. Thus,
whatever success the Guidelines achieve in standardizing sentences
meted out to convicted organizations, the Guidelines break significant
ground.
By enacting the Guidelines, Congress has acknowledged, however un-
wittingly, that it is possible, and fair, to identify an organization's intent
for purposes of assessing criminal punishment. Congress has, however,
begun at the end of the problem rather than at the beginning. By the
time an organization is sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines, it has
already been convicted under an inappropriate standard of liability and is
well on its way to suffering the consequences that flow from a criminal
117. Id § 8D.4(b)(2).
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investigation and conviction. Congress should complete the task of ana-
lyzing organizational criminal liability and enact a jurisprudentially
sound standard of criminal liability that furthers, rather than diminishes,
the power of the criminal law.
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss2/4
